The ASEAN Stance at Copenhagen

This week the ten ASEAN member states released a joint statement on climate change during the 15^th ASEAN summit. Beyond the standard boilerplate, it’s clear that ASEAN and its constituent states are preparing for an aggressive negotiation at Copenhagen—a move that aligns it heavily with China, but less so with its citizens. While nominally voicing support for the outgoing Kyoto Protocol and for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), one phrase in particular sums up its approach: “in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” Although this position is not a new one, it is an indication that ASEAN is unlikely to show flexibility in its insistence that developed nations “take the lead” in reducing emissions. Whether the approval of ASEAN’s neighbor to the north is worth popular outrage remains to be seen.

Protestors outside the ASEAN summit in Thailand

There is, on the whole, little disagreement within the ASEAN governments about Copenhagen. The Singaporean Minister for the Environment, Yaacob Ibrahim, summed it up when he stated last week that, “We are not obligated to set targets or reduce emissions.” This sentiment has been widely echoed; to date, only Indonesia has committed to emissions cuts.

The question raised by this aggressive stance is how deeply it will pit ASEAN governments against their neighbors and their own citizens. Australia and Japan have voiced strong disapproval over the neighbors’ intransigence. A huge rally in Bangkok illustrated the extent of popular outrage over perceived inaction on climate change. At a Greenpeace protest at the Thailand summit, protestors railed against the states’ inactions on emissions and forestry: “Yet, instead of recognising their enormous obligation to safeguard the region, ASEAN appears to still be in denial over these threats.”

China and India are very likely the prime movers behind ASEAN’s united front. As the largest bilateral trade partners with ASEAN nations, they have vastly more leverage than Australia, Japan, or even popular protests. It is difficult to imagine that at Copenhagen, the individual ASEAN member states will have the gall to buck the Chinese mantra: “We’re all for emissions cuts – you go first.”

The Payoffs of Disaster Preparedness

Last week’s cluster of disasters – typhoons Ketsana, Parma and Ondoy and the 7.6 temblor that rocked Padang, Indonesia – reinforced the need for robust disaster preparedness and mitigation programs for the world’s densest locations. The focus of disaster preparedness has largely been on Asia.

74% of natural disaster deaths in 2006 occurred in Asia

While this region may be at the forefront of the issue, a boost to funding and bolstering of readiness – starting in Copenhagen – will have positive effects from Sydney to Mexico City.

As with urban resilience, most plans for disaster preparedness follow the model of the UN’s International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the 2005 Hyogo Framework: identify risks, design appropriate measures, and implement.

The Asian Development Bank, among other groups, has a sophisticated model (at right) that pairs a risk assessment specialist, a geoscientist and a GIS expert. Importantly, the UN, ADB and other groups in this field acknowledge the importance of continuing education and addressing ongoing environmental degradation.

A Child is Rescued from Flooding in Central Vietnam

Governments should recognize that the importance of emergency readiness lies in its cost-to-reward ratio. Convincing evidence shows that comparatively simple measures, affordable by developing nations, can have a huge payoff. The UNISDR notes that Gulf Coast residents who collectively spent $2.5 million on hurricane protection avoided nearly $500 million in damages. It further found that a comparatively inexpensive cyclone warning system in Bangladesh that utilizes volunteers with megaphones has reduced storm deaths by a hundredfold since 1970.

As Copenhagen approaches, countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines should go in prepared to argue for the proven effectiveness and financial viability of disaster preparedness analysis and implementation.

Urban Resilience

Flooding in Quezon City

This week’s horrifying news of the flooding that has inundated the Quezon City area of Manila brings to the fore the increasingly relevant discussion of how best to prepare urban areas for changing climates. By the year 2050, 70% of the Earth’s inhabitants will live in cities, up from 50% today. Much of this growth will occur in Asian cities that already struggle with overpopulation, poor sanitation and access to clean water. If the unique hazards of climate change are to be successfully mitigated, a frank conversation is needed about how to make urban areas adaptable and resilient.

A constellation of studies has shown that urban centers in low and middle income nations are particularly vulnerable to the sort of periodic, high-intensity disasters commonly associated with climate change. The effects of flooding, sea level rise, cyclonic storms, landslide and heat waves are concentrated: “a large and growing proportion of these deaths are in these nations’ urban areas,” a UN Secretariat report notes. Indeed, a 2009 primer from the World Bank’s Climate Resilient Cities program highlighted the specific danger of “widespread flooding” to Makati City, another low-lying area of Manila.

GIS maps, such as this one of the Mekong Delta, can facilitate urban disaster preparedness

That climate change will potentiate the growing health, economic and social crises of urbanization is well established. Less so is how to tackle the problem of resilience; as the UN report notes, local governments are often ill-equipped to prepare for events such as cataclysmic flooding. One promising approach, introduced by The Rockefeller Foundation’s Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, involves a multi-phased approach. Utilizing partner groups at the city, regional and national level, ACCCRN calls first for city selection based on risk and capacity, followed by urban-level vulnerability assessments and a resilience action plan. The final step – implementation – is monitored and adapted on an ongoing basis and successes tagged for replication.

Building on the knowledge that each city faces unique challenges and has unique capabilities, the goal, in the World Bank’s words, of building, “compact, efficient, and walkable cities” that minimize risk must be a top priority for climate change policymakers and planners alike.

Beyond the Hotspot – What Vietnam Can Teach Us About Biodiversity

Central Annamites Mountains, courtesy of Indochina Legend

Biodiversity hotspots, according to Conservation International, are, “the richest and most threatened reservoirs of plant and animal life on earth.” These islands of natural abundance cover less than 3% of the Earth’s surface yet host a stunning array of plant and animal life. Imperiled by the twin threats of habitat loss and climate change, hotspots may be ground zero for the jump in extinctions that is widely believed to be looming.  Amid the busy schedule of upcoming summits such as COP-15, the best hope for prioritizing the preservation of biodiversity may hinge upon adoption of a more pragmatic approach to negotiation.  Stressing the favorable impact of forested land on reducing temperatures and providing food and economic security to the broader community, may prove a more persuasive argument than preservation for the sake of exotic plant and animal life.

Vietnam provides an excellent example of how biodiversity preservation may be tied to the larger climate change and economic policy debates. A WWF Vietnam study has found that the Central Annamites forests in Vietnam have been steadily losing biodiversity as they are degraded by climate change and human encroachment. As forests recede, loss of biodiversity creates a cascade effect that ultimately harms local rice, soybean, fish and fruit harvests thereby reducing the food security of the surrounding communities. It is these considerations, and not the plight of comparatively obscure hotspot species that will be in negotiators’ minds as they sit down at Copenhagen. Combined with the assertion, made by scientists such as Nguyen Ninh in this study, that biodiversity may be a powerful mitigation tool, policymakers and environmentalists need to confront the reality that hotspots, which capture the imagination, may be less useful for climate progress than the forests and fields that drive the global economy.

The possibilities and pitfalls of strategic cooperation between Southeast Asia and China

China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor – Condoleezza Rice, 2000

As the 14th  ASEAN summit gets ready to kick off in Pattaya, Thailand this week, climate change may be an unlikely source of debate. The role of climate action in ASEAN nations is intricately linked to the looming presence of China, and lately China-ASEAN cooperation has bloomed. Chinese sources in particular stress the importance of “mutually beneficial cooperation” with ASEAN on economic and climate issues. In fact, the ASEAN secretariat and China’s environment ministry recently inked a draft environmental protection strategy (see sidebar) focusing heavily on climate change. Moreover, last September ASEAN secretary general Surin Pitsuwan praised a memorandum of understanding between ASEAN and China’s Guangdong province.

However, what these innocuous news clips are masking is a fiery debate about China’s influence over Southeast Asia. Since China and Thailand composed a free-trade agreement in 2003, bilateral trade has risen 35.8% between the two countries. Why Thailand? Many claim that this is Thailand’s reward for acquiescing to China’s expansionist aims and bullying tactics among ASEAN nations. Will China’s size and influence enrich economic growth in ASEAN nations and foster partnerships on environmental protection and climate change? Or, as Chinese general Liu Chengjun believes, are territorial disputes more likely as the effects of climate change  coupled with economic crisis increase competition for resources?

“The tendency for China to offer economic incentives for smaller states to fall in line with Chinese strategic thinking (and economically punish those that do not)” is a far-reaching source of contention and no doubt intimately linked with climate change efforts. Unnervingly, China has openly stated that environmental action will not come “at the expense of economic development.” With the full economic power of China enveloping Southeast Asia and its forging ever more close-knit ties with Chinese markets, what realistic opportunities will there be for ASEAN nations to embark on meaningful climate remediation programs free of Chinese pressure to develop? Furthermore, if ASEAN leaders begin answering only to China, what will be ASEAN’s relevance for Southeast Asian countries?