The ASEAN Stance at Copenhagen

This week the ten ASEAN member states released a joint statement on climate change during the 15^th ASEAN summit. Beyond the standard boilerplate, it’s clear that ASEAN and its constituent states are preparing for an aggressive negotiation at Copenhagen—a move that aligns it heavily with China, but less so with its citizens. While nominally voicing support for the outgoing Kyoto Protocol and for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), one phrase in particular sums up its approach: “in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” Although this position is not a new one, it is an indication that ASEAN is unlikely to show flexibility in its insistence that developed nations “take the lead” in reducing emissions. Whether the approval of ASEAN’s neighbor to the north is worth popular outrage remains to be seen.

Protestors outside the ASEAN summit in Thailand

There is, on the whole, little disagreement within the ASEAN governments about Copenhagen. The Singaporean Minister for the Environment, Yaacob Ibrahim, summed it up when he stated last week that, “We are not obligated to set targets or reduce emissions.” This sentiment has been widely echoed; to date, only Indonesia has committed to emissions cuts.

The question raised by this aggressive stance is how deeply it will pit ASEAN governments against their neighbors and their own citizens. Australia and Japan have voiced strong disapproval over the neighbors’ intransigence. A huge rally in Bangkok illustrated the extent of popular outrage over perceived inaction on climate change. At a Greenpeace protest at the Thailand summit, protestors railed against the states’ inactions on emissions and forestry: “Yet, instead of recognising their enormous obligation to safeguard the region, ASEAN appears to still be in denial over these threats.”

China and India are very likely the prime movers behind ASEAN’s united front. As the largest bilateral trade partners with ASEAN nations, they have vastly more leverage than Australia, Japan, or even popular protests. It is difficult to imagine that at Copenhagen, the individual ASEAN member states will have the gall to buck the Chinese mantra: “We’re all for emissions cuts – you go first.”

The possibilities and pitfalls of strategic cooperation between Southeast Asia and China

China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor – Condoleezza Rice, 2000

As the 14th  ASEAN summit gets ready to kick off in Pattaya, Thailand this week, climate change may be an unlikely source of debate. The role of climate action in ASEAN nations is intricately linked to the looming presence of China, and lately China-ASEAN cooperation has bloomed. Chinese sources in particular stress the importance of “mutually beneficial cooperation” with ASEAN on economic and climate issues. In fact, the ASEAN secretariat and China’s environment ministry recently inked a draft environmental protection strategy (see sidebar) focusing heavily on climate change. Moreover, last September ASEAN secretary general Surin Pitsuwan praised a memorandum of understanding between ASEAN and China’s Guangdong province.

However, what these innocuous news clips are masking is a fiery debate about China’s influence over Southeast Asia. Since China and Thailand composed a free-trade agreement in 2003, bilateral trade has risen 35.8% between the two countries. Why Thailand? Many claim that this is Thailand’s reward for acquiescing to China’s expansionist aims and bullying tactics among ASEAN nations. Will China’s size and influence enrich economic growth in ASEAN nations and foster partnerships on environmental protection and climate change? Or, as Chinese general Liu Chengjun believes, are territorial disputes more likely as the effects of climate change  coupled with economic crisis increase competition for resources?

“The tendency for China to offer economic incentives for smaller states to fall in line with Chinese strategic thinking (and economically punish those that do not)” is a far-reaching source of contention and no doubt intimately linked with climate change efforts. Unnervingly, China has openly stated that environmental action will not come “at the expense of economic development.” With the full economic power of China enveloping Southeast Asia and its forging ever more close-knit ties with Chinese markets, what realistic opportunities will there be for ASEAN nations to embark on meaningful climate remediation programs free of Chinese pressure to develop? Furthermore, if ASEAN leaders begin answering only to China, what will be ASEAN’s relevance for Southeast Asian countries?